ULRAG

Gerrymandering: Drawing the Lines that Divide Us

By Ben Pope — October 6, 2025

Introduction

Last month, Governor Greg Abbott of Texas signed a new congressional map into law, which is projected to create five new Republican-leaning districts in the House of Representatives for the 2026 midterm elections. This has not come without its criticism with public outcry within Texas and across the nation. Texas Republicans have defended the action, invoking Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U.S. (2019), in which the Supreme Court declared that claims of partisan gerrymandering are nonjusticiable political questions. Citing Rucho’s language allowing redistricting for “nakedly partisan purposes,” state officials maintain that the legislature’s map is upheld by the Constitution.

However, there becomes a grey area when these partisan drawings cross racial lines. This question lies at the heart of the case League of United Latin American Citizens v. Abbott, No. 3:21-cv-00259 (W.D. Tex. 2021), in which the plaintiffs argue that this new congressional map in Texas violates the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments as well as Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Claiming that this map disparages racial minority citizens, this case pushes the bounds of judicial powers due to racial identity and political affiliation being so often intertwined.

Other states are taking moves in defiance to Governor Abbott. California Governor Gavin Newsom, one of Texas’ fiercest critics, claims he will maintain the political landscape by creating five new Democratic-leaning districts in his state. This has proven to be more challenging since California requires an independent commission to draw the maps, a law intended to dismantle these exact scenarios. Hoping to temporarily upend this requirement, Governor Newsom has rallied California voters behind a special election to take place on November 4 and determine whether they redraw the maps. As tensions grow between states, the long-standing debate of gerrymandering, or the malapportionment of congressional districts, continues to play out in the courts.

History

The first modern complaint of gerrymandering was seen by the Supreme Court in the landmark case Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). This involved the redrawing of the district around Tuskegee, Alabama from a perfect square into a 28-sided figure, effectively excluding every Black voter and putting them into new districts. This was the first case to rule such districting as a blatant violation of the Fifteenth Amendment and set a precedent for the illegality of gerrymandering along racial lines.

Two years later in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), a Tennessee man brought suit against the state of Tennessee, arguing that since the districts had not been redrawn since 1901, and since population had grown disproportionately more in urban areas, rural voters had more voting power in their respective districts. Baker claimed that this violated the Equal Protection Clause, saying his vote had less value than others and thus was not equally protected under the law. The State of Tennessee argued, per the ruling of Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), that all matters of district apportionment were strictly political and could not be touched by the judiciary. Baker v. Carr determined that the Political Question Doctrine set by Colegrove should be overturned, shifting the focus to whether voters’ representation was diluted and opening the door to future political interpretation using the Equal Protection Clause.

Soon after, in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), the courts used this Equal Protection Clause interpreted from the Fourteenth Amendment to establish the idea of “one person, one vote,” arguing that “legislators represent people, not trees or acres.”

In Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986), Democrats from Indiana petitioned for the redrawing of the 1981 Indiana apportionment scheme, believing that it was political gerrymandering and suppressing the voting power of Democrats. As ruled in Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court agreed to the illegality of the subject but created a standard of strict scrutiny regarding gerrymandering cases. The courts ruled that yes, partisan gerrymandering is against the law, but it was now decided that plaintiffs must show discriminatory intent and discriminatory effect, with the latter proving to be a great obstacle that the Indiana Democrats could not meet. This set the standard of ruling for many years, with many subsequent cases failing to meet these standards.

Recently, the Supreme Court once again ruled on partisan gerrymandering in Rucho v. Common Cause, and once again they overturned precedent. The Court ruled that, although a detriment to our democratic systems, it was strictly a problem of the other branches when, as stated earlier, the apportionment was attributed to “nakedly partisan” reasons. The implications of this case are varied, as racial cases are still justiciable, but once again partisan cases have no judicially manageable standard. The dissenting opinion claims that this calls the Equal Representation Clause into question, arguing that it denies the ability to equally participate in the voting process regardless of belief—that there is no longer the doctrine of “one person, one vote.” The decision still stands.

Now

Today, this point of contention once again unfolds. The dissent of Texas redistricting entered the courts in 2021 in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Abbott and now tests both the aspects of partisan and racial gerrymandering, determining links between race and party affiliation. It is still ongoing, with a supplemental complaint being added to the suit recently in order to address the new districts created in Texas last month. The Roberts Court has consistently struck down racial gerrymanders, as in Allen v. Milligan, 599 U.S. 1 (2023), while simultaneously refusing to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims, as in Rucho v. Common Cause.

Should the Court agree that this link between race and political affiliation is both statistically significant and justiciable, LULAC v. Abbott could cause a reconsideration of Rucho and in doing so provide a constitutional safeguard against all forms of gerrymandering for decades to come. Should the Court reject that there is any link and uphold that gerrymandering is strictly political, the doors could open to increasingly extreme redistricting. This could affect elections significantly and lock states into perpetual partisanship, turning the idea of a “swing state” into a relic of the past.

Bibliography

• Allen v. Milligan, 599 U.S. 1 (2023).
• Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
• Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
• Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
• League of United Latin American Citizens v. Abbott, No. 3:21-cv-00259 (W.D. Tex. 2021).
• Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
• Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
• Supplemental Complaint, LULAC v. Abbott, No. 3:21-cv-00259 (W.D. Tex. filed Aug. 25, 2025).
• U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
• U.S. Const. amend. XV.